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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

FIRST EMPIRE CORPORATION
(directly and derivatively in its
Capacity as a shareholder of
LecStar Corporation), ALAN B.
THOMAS, JR. (directly and
derivatively in his capacity as a
shareholder of LecStar Corporation)
and HEATHER McFARLAND (directly
and derivatively in her capacity as a
shareholder of LecStar Corporation),
Plaintiffs,

v.
JOHN C. CANOUSE,
STEPHEN M. HICKS, SOUTHRIDGE
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC,
W. DALE SMITH, CACHE CAPITAL
(USA), L.P., ATLANTIS CAPITAL
FUND, LTD., and McCORMACK
AVENUE, LTD.,
Defendants,

v.
LECSTAR CORPORATION,
as a Nominal Defendant.
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)
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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)
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CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 2004CV88793

-------------)
Order on Motion for Declaratory Judgment
This case is before the Court on the Southridge Defendants,1 Motion for an Order
Affirming the Procedures That Will Be Employed to Distribute Any Derivative Award

1 The Southridge Defendants are Stephen Hicks, Southridge Capital Management, LLC
("Southridge") and McCormack Avenue, Ltd. ("McCormack") (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Southridge Defendants").

("Derivative Distribution Motion"). In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendants first raised the issue of derivative proceeds distribution. The Court declined
to rule on that issue in conjunction with the motion for summary judgment finding that it
was not properly before the Court. After this issue was again raised during a telephone
conference with the parties on February 9, 2009, the Court invited a motion and briefing
on the issue of derivative proceeds distribution. After reviewing the Derivative
Distribution Motion, the record of the case and the briefs submitted by the parties, the
Court finds as follows:
This case involves shareholder derivative claims alleging breached fiduciary
duties, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties, civil conspiracy, and unjust
enrichment. LecStar was a publically traded company, organized in 1998 in Texas, that
operated as a Competitive Local Exchange in the deregulated telecom environment.
LecStar Corporation was involuntarily dissolved on February 13, 2003.
The Southridge Defendants do not themselves own stock in LecStar, but hold
interests in companies that are shareholders of LecStar, and, thus, are impacted, albeit
indirectly, by this Order. In addition, Defendants John C. Canouse, W. Dale Smith,
Cache Capital (USA), L.P., and Atlantic Capital Fund, Ltd. are shareholders of LecStar
and their rights will be affected by this Order. Therefore, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2
and this Court's finding that the issues raised in this Derivative Distribution Motion
present an actual, justicable controversy involving the parties, this matter shall be
treated as a motion for declaratory judgment. O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 ("In cases of actual
controversy, the respective superior courts of this state shall have power, upon petition
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or other appropriate pleading, to declare rights and other legal relations of any
interested party petitioning for such declaration ... ").2
Defendants petition the Court to affirm that any proceeds from the derivative
claims are distributed pursuant to Texas Business Corporation Act Sections 6.04 and
7.12 where any recovery would be paid to LecStar, which would first pay any
outstanding debts and liabilities before distributing any remaining recovery pro rata to all
shareholders. V.A.T.S. Bus. Corp. Act, Art. 7.12 (2009). Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
petition the Court to defer ruling on the distribution issue, or, in the alternative, to either
distribute any recovery pursuant to the Court's equity powers, or, in the event of
ordering a statutory distribution, to declare that LecStar has no outstanding debts.
The Court finds that LecStar is governed by Texas law. Diedrich v. Miller &
Meier & Assoc., Architects and Planners, Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735 (Ga. 1985). Article
7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act specifically allows for a dissolved
corporation to continue its corporate existence for up to three years from the date of
dissolution for "prosecuting or defending in its corporate name any action or proceeding
by or against the dissolved corporation." V.A.T.S. Bus. Corp. Act, Art. 7.12. Article 7.12
further requires that any "assets .... collected by the dissolved corporation" shall be
distributed pursuant to Article 6.04 of the Act first to pay debts and liabilities and then as
a pro rata shareholder distribution.

19..; § 6.04.

Plaintiffs requested that the Court deny the Derivative Distribution Motion as being
improperly before the Court because it seeks to declare the rights of parties not before
the Court, because Defendants did not plead a counterclaim relating to distribution, and
because it is improper for predetermination.
2
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This derivative suit was brought within the three-year time limit for claims on
behalf of a dissolved corporation. Therefore, the distribution process specifically
outlined by the Texas Legislature shall not be disrupted by this Court.
Plaintiffs urge the Court to utilize its equitable powers to order that any recovery
be paid into the registry of the Court whereupon a claims process for all "innocent"
shareholders would be initiated. Plaintiffs urge the Court to disallow a pro rata
distribution to Defendants who were also shareholders in LecStar and to LecStar
shareholders invested in or managed by the Defendants. Additionally, under Plaintiffs'
proposed distribution scheme, they ask the Court to strip distribution rights away from
"innocent" shareholders who fail to make a claim upon the Court to share in the
derivative proceeds distribution.
Plaintiffs cite to a few cases in foreign jurisdictions to support their petition, but those
cases are distinguishable on the grounds that such relief was granted under common
law and not in contradiction of a clear statute governing the distribution of such
proceeds. See, e.g., Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1131 (Wyo. 1985) (granting
recovery directly to the minority shareholder upon a finding that the 'Wyoming Business
Corporation Act does not dictate a contrary result."); Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357,
366 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1927) (granting direct recovery to injured shareholders under
common law); Natoli v. Carriage House Motor Inn, Inc." No. 85-CV-1457, 1988 WL
53397, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 1988) (declining to grant a direct award to the minority
shareholder because "to deviate from the general rule" would increase the minority
shareholder's interest in the corporation.); cf. Martin v. Texas Woman's Hosp., Inc., 930
S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. App.-Houston 1996) ("At common law, the legal existence of a
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corporation was terminated upon dissolution. In order to alleviate the draconian effect of
this principle, the courts developed the "trust fund theory," ... The legislature ultimately
codified the trust fund theory in article 7.12 .... ").
Plaintiffs raise a point-one that is not missed by the Court-that without a
"direct" recovery to Plaintiffs, Defendants will be allowed to profit from their
wrongdoings. 3 Such is the result with any derivative suit where the Defendants are also
corporate shareholders. Years of case law and legislation regarding derivative suits
have not yielded a rule that wrong-doing shareholders are excluded from sharing in a

pro rata distribution. On the contrary, the Texas statute clearly states that distributions
shall be made to all shareholders. Additionally, the distribution plan proposed by
Plaintiffs places the Court in the untenable position of eliminating the claims of debtors
and even those of shareholders in the event that they failed to respond to the Court's
notice. Equity powers are broad, but must be exercised prudently.
Plaintiffs argue that LecStar is defunct, has no operating board of directors, and
is incapable of receiving an award and distributing it to shareholders. The Court agrees
and finds wisdom in Defendants' suggestion that the Court appoint a trustee or receiver
to oversee the collection and distribution of any recovery. In the event of recovery on
the derivative claims, the parties shall submit to the Court within ten days of the entry of
Judgment, a list containing the names of three proposed and agreed upon individuals

The Court declines to exercise its cy pres power to direct that only innocent
shareholders be awarded a recovery and that the remainder of any damages amount be
paid to a charitable organization consistent with the practice established in some
consumer class actions. See, e.g., In re Motorsports Merch. Anti-Trust-Lltig., 160
F.Supp. 2d 1392, 1395 (N.D.Ga. 2001) (finding that neither plaintiffs nor defendants had
a legal right to unclaimed settlement amounts and awarding it to various charitable
organizations ).
3
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who, they agree, could serve in the capacity as trustee or receiver for any award. The
Court will select one of these to serve as trustee.
Plaintiffs petition the Court to declare that there are no outstanding debts or liabilities
existing against LecStar in the event that the Court found, as it has, that proceeds shall
be distributed pursuant to the Texas Business Corporation Act. Plaintiffs highlight the
three year time limit for all claims against dissolved corporations and argue that there
are no claims against LecStar other than this lawsuit. 4 This issue, however, is not
properly before the Court, and may require a more fully-developed record. Therefore,
the Court declines to rule on this issue and shall leave the record open on this matter
until closed by further action of this Court.

50 ORDERED this 22nd day of April, 2009.

Al(tA-D@o~
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Only two cases have been brought within this time: this action and a Cobb County
collection action filed by James Grenfell to collect on a 2002 arbitration award. Plaintiffs
and Mr. Grenfell, however, have signed a subordination agreement.
4
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Copies to:
Attorneys for First Empire Corporation. Alan B. Thomas. Jr.
Richard L. Tate .
Libby King
Tate & Associates
206 South 2nd Street
Richmond, TX 77469
rltate@tate-Iaw.com
ebking@tate-Iaw.com
Mark F. Dehler
Michael E. Perez
Mark F. Dehler, LLC
201 Swanton Way
Decatur, GA 30030
(404) 371-1100
mark@dehlerlaw.com
Michael@dehlerlaw.com
John M. Q'Quinn
Mike Meyer
THE Q'QUINN LAW FIRM
440 Louisiana, Suite 2300
Houston, TX 77002
(713) 223-1000
Fax: 713-222-6903
pamb@oqlaw.com
James W. Christian
CHRISTIAN SMITH & JEWELL, LLP
2302 Fannin, Suite 500
Houston, TX 77002
713-659-7617
jwc@csj-Iaw.com
Kristin K. Reis
Tate Moerer & King, LLP
206 South Second Street
Richmond, Texas 77469
281-341-0077
281-341-1003 (facsimile)
www.tate-Iaw.com

Cache Capital (USA) LP
Cache Capital USA, L.P.
3440 Preston Ridge Road
Suite 600
Alpharetta, GA 3005
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Attorneys for: Stephen M. Hicks.
South ridge Capital Management LLC. McCormack Avenue. LTD
Lonnie L. Simpson
DLA PIPER US LLP
101 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 2000
Tampa, FL 33602-5149
(813) 222-5921
lonnie.simpson@dlapiper.com
Mark E. Grantham
Anthony D. Lehman
Job Seese
DLA PIPER US LLP
One Atlantic Center
1201 West Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-3450
(404) 736-7800
Fax: 404-682-7800
Mark.Grantham@dlapiper.com
tony.lehman@dlapiper.com
job.seese@dlapiper.com
Perrie M. Weiner
Robert D. Weber
DLA PIPER US LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
4th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 595-3009
Fax: 310-595-3300
perrie.weiner@dlapiper.com
Robert.Weber@dlapiper.com
William B. Hill, Jr.
Joseph C. Sharp
ASHE, RAFUSE & HILL, LLP
1355 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Suite 500, South Tower
Atlanta, GA 30309-3232
(404) 253-6025
williamhill@asherafuse.com
joesharp@asherafuse.com

Defendant John C. Canouse
Mr. John C. Canouse, CEO
JPC Capital Partners, Inc.
3440 Preston Ridge Road, Suite 600
Alpharetta, Georgia, 30005
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Defendant Dale W. Smith
Mr. Dale Smith
215 Carriage Way Lane
Roswell, Georgia 30076
LecStar Corporation
LecStar Corporation
c/o Texas Secretary of State
Citations Unit
PO Box 12079
Austin, Texas 78711-2079
LTEL Corporation
Stephen Hicks
South ridge Capital Management, LLC
Sovereign Partners, LP
L TEL Holdings Corporation
90 Grove Street
Ridgefield, Connecticut 06877
LTEL Holdings Corporation
2 Ravinia Drive
Suite 1300
Atlanta, GA 30346
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
Durham Jones & Pinegar
111 East Broadway
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
jjones@djplaw.com
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